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365 
ESSAY 
A Burkean Perspective on Patent 
Eligibility, Part II: Reflections on the 
(Counter) Revolution in Patent Law 
Thomas F. Cotter* 
 In 2007, I published an essay in the Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal, titled A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 
in which I discussed how the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office had discarded various doctrines relating to 
patent eligibility—among them, rules that all patentable 
inventions must pertain to the technological arts, that they 
may not read on mental steps, and that patentable processes 
must effect a physical transformation—in favor of an approach 
that asked only whether an invention had practical utility and 
was predictable in its effects. Taking a cue from the (admittedly 
non-patent related) writings of the Anglo-Irish statesmen and 
political theorist Edmund Burke, I argued that some aspects of 
the older approach to patentable subject matter may have 
embodied an underappreciated wisdom, to the extent these 
older doctrines prevented patent law from intruding upon both 
laws of nature and human liberty interests, including freedom 
of speech and personal autonomy. At the same time, I 
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recognized that, as times change, the law too must change, and 
I contended that it would be inadvisable to exclude computer 
and business-related art from the scope of patentable subject 
matter altogether. I nevertheless argued that, properly 
reformed and refined, the older doctrines could still play a 
useful role in preventing patent law from unduly extending its 
reach into every nook and cranny of human endeavor. 
Three years later, as we await the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the legal landscape 
appears to have changed substantially. From a time just prior 
to the publication of my Burkean paper and continuing to the 
present day, the Court has actively scaled back some of the 
Federal Circuit’s more expansive readings of patent doctrine in 
cases such as eBay Inc., MedImmune, KSR, Microsoft, and 
Quanta. Both the Federal Circuit and the Patent Office have 
applied more restrictive standards for patent eligibility as well, 
and the Supreme Court may go farther yet. Perhaps the greater 
risk now is that courts and other policymakers will settle on a 
formalistic approach that blindly adheres to the form of 
traditional doctrines while ignoring those doctrines’ underlying 
rationales. I will argue that a workable standard for patent 
eligibility should reflect the wisdom embodied in tradition, 
while being flexible enough to accommodate advances in 
relatively new useful arts such as information technology and 
biotechnology. In particular, I will argue that three screens 
derived from traditional patent doctrine—a “technological arts” 
screen, a “minimal physicality” screen, and a “noninvasiveness” 
screen, as I will define them—should suffice to ensure that 
patent law continues to encourage technological progress, 
without precluding access to the public domain building blocks 
from which such progress arises. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Just a few years ago, it appeared to most observers that 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit1 and 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) had 
discarded several limiting doctrines relating to patent 
eligibility—including the technological arts doctrine, the 
mental steps doctrine, and the requirement that patentable 
                                                          
 1. Since 1982, the Federal Circuit is the court that hears (almost) all 
appeals in patent infringement litigation in the United States. 
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processes effect a physical transformation—in favor of an 
approach that asked only whether an invention had practical 
utility and was predictable in its effects.2 In a paper I wrote in 
2006 and published in 2007, I argued that some aspects of 
these discarded doctrines nevertheless may have reflected an 
underappreciated wisdom insofar as they helped to prevent 
patent law from privatizing laws of nature and other naturally 
occurring phenomena, and from unduly encroaching upon 
important human liberty and autonomy interests.3 At the same 
time, I argued, as times change, the law too must change; in 
particular, I expressed doubt that altogether excluding 
computer and business-related art from the scope of patentable 
subject matter would be advisable.4 Nevertheless, I concluded 
that, properly reformed and refined, the older doctrines 
referenced above could still play a useful role in preventing 
patent law from potentially extending into every nook and 
cranny of human behavior.5 
                                                          
 2. For an overview of these developments, see Thomas F. Cotter, A 
Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855, 859–
74 (2007). See generally State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373–76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a system that 
involved the transformation of data by a machine constituted patentable 
subject matter, because it was a “practical application of a mathematical 
algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produce[d] a ‘useful, concrete, 
and tangible result’”; and laying to rest the exclusion of business methods from 
the scope of patent eligibility), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 
(2009); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (holding that a process that did not involve a physical transformation of 
matter was patentable because it produced “a tangible, useful, result”), 
abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943; Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q. 2d 
(BNA) 1385, 1385–86 (B.P.A.I. 2005) (per curiam) (rejecting the technological 
arts doctrine); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS FOR 
PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING AND 
PROCEDURE § 2106, at 2100-11 (8th ed., rev. Aug. 2006) (conforming with 
Lundgren, and not imposing a technological arts requirement). At present, 
patent examiners are advised to continue following the guidelines as set forth 
in Manual of Patent Examining and Procedure § 2106 (8th ed., rev. July 2008), 
with certain modifications in light of the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 953–54, 957. See Memorandum from John J. Love, Deputy 
Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, to Tech. Ctr. Dirs., Patent 
Examining Corps (Jan. 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/methods/bilski_guidance_memo.pdf. 
 3. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 879–95. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
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In the four years since I authored that earlier paper, the 
legal landscape has changed dramatically. In a much-discussed 
series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has scaled 
back some of the Federal Circuit’s more expansive readings of 
patent doctrine.6 In addition, both the Federal Circuit and the 
USPTO have applied more restrictive standards for patent 
eligibility, as evidenced in cases including (most famously) In re 
Bilski7 as well as some administrative decisions from the Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences.8 As of this writing, 
                                                          
 6. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2119 
(2008) (holding that patent exhaustion is triggered by the sale of products the 
“only reasonable and intended use” of which is “to practice the patent” and 
which embody “essential features” of the patented invention); Microsoft Corp. 
v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441–42 (2007) (holding that Patent Act § 271(f) 
did not apply, where defendant sent “computer software . . . from the United 
States to a foreign manufacturer on a master disk, or by electronic 
transmission,” and the foreign recipient then engaged in conduct that, had it 
occurred within the United States, would have infringed the U.S. patent); KSR 
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (rejecting the “rigid and 
mandatory” application of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test for 
determining nonobviousness); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 
118, 137 (2007) (holding that a patent licensee is “not required . . . to break or 
terminate its . . . license . . . before seeking a declaratory judgment . . . that the 
underlying patent was invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed”); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (rejecting the Federal 
Circuit’s rule that the prevailing plaintiff in a patent infringement action was 
automatically entitled to permanent injunctive relief absent exceptional 
circumstances, and holding that the propriety of injunctive relief is a matter 
for a court to determine in accordance with “traditional equitable principles”). 
 7. 545 F.3d at 953–57 (holding that “[a] claimed process is surely patent-
eligible . . . if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it 
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing”; that patentable 
methods do not preempt all practical uses of a fundamental principle; and that 
“the recited machine or transformation must not constitute mere ‘insignificant 
postsolution activity’”). See also In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (holding that claimed method failed the machine-or-transformation 
test); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 980–81 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (similar); Classen 
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 
2008) (affirming judgment that method of treatment claims constituted 
nonpatentable subject matter); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (holding that signals are not patentable subject matter). But see 
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1345 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that methods of treatment constituted patentable 
subject matter, because they “‘transform[ed] an article into a different state or 
thing,’ and this transformation is ‘central to the purpose of the claimed 
process’”), pet’n for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2009) (No. 09-
490). 
 8. Compare, e.g., Ex parte Dickerson, Appeal 2009-001172, at 16 
(B.P.A.I. July 9, 2009), available at 
http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdf?system=BPAI&flNm=fd2009001172-07-
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however, the ultimate resolution of the patent eligibility debate 
remains uncertain while the Bilski case remains pending before 
the United States Supreme Court.9 With respect to patentable 
subject matter in particular, the risk now is that courts and 
other policymakers will settle on formalistic approaches which 
blindly adhere to the form of traditional doctrines while 
ignoring those doctrines’ underlying rationales. As I have 
contended previously, patent eligibility should reflect the 
wisdom embodied in tradition while being flexible enough to 
accommodate advances in information technology, 
biotechnology, and other emerging fields.10 
In this brief Essay, I will argue that three overlapping 
criteria or screens should suffice to ensure that patent law 
continues to encourage technological progress without 
precluding access to the public domain building blocks from 
which such progress arises. Part II restates the framework I 
proposed in my 2006 article. Part III briefly recounts the 
“counterrevolution” in patent law as initiated by the Supreme 
Court during the intervening years. Part IV sets forth my 
proposed three screens; Part V concludes by discussing their 
application to some current issues, and some potential 
                                                          
09-2009-1 (holding that claims including “a step of outputting information 
from a computer” were tied to a particular machine), with Ex parte Cornea-
Hasegan, 89 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1557, 1560 (B.P.A.I. 2009) (holding that 
recitation of a series of steps to be performed on a processor did not recite 
patentable subject matter, because not tied to a particular machine); Ex parte 
Halligan, 89 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1355, 1364–65 (B.P.A.I. 2008) (similar); Ex 
parte Langemyr, 89 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1988, 1996–98 (B.P.A.I. 2008) (holding, 
in an informative opinion, that a method executed in a computer apparatus 
was not patentable subject matter, because it was not tied to a “particular 
machine”); Ex parte Wasynczuk, 87 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1826, 1833–35 (B.P.A.I. 
2008) (informative opinion similar to Langemyr, but also holding that a 
combination of two computing devices operating together was a particular 
apparatus). See also, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 620 F. 
Supp. 2d 1068, 1077–78 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a method for detecting 
fraud over the Internet was not patentable subject matter). Opinions differ 
also as to whether Beauregard claims (software on a disk) remain patentable 
post-Bilski. Compare Ex parte Li, 88 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1695, 1698–99 
(B.P.A.I. 2008) (holding that they are), with Cybersource, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 
1078–81 (holding that the Bilski analysis applies to such claims, and that the 
claims at issue were not patentable subject matter); Cornea-Hasegan, 89 
U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1561–62 (similar to Cybersource). 
 9. The Court heard oral argument on November 9, 2009. See Transcript 
of Oral Argument, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (Nov. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-
964.pdf. 
 10. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 878–79. 
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counterarguments. 
II.  BURKE AND PATENTS: THE PERSPECTIVE AS OF 2006 
To put my argument in context, my 2006 paper attempted 
to ground the patent eligibility debate in the political thought 
of the Anglo-Irish statesman and political philosopher Edmund 
Burke.11 To be sure, Burke himself left few if any clues 
regarding his views on the patent system. My argument 
therefore drew on two more general, and related, aspects of 
Burkean thought as reflected in Burke’s landmark work 
Reflections on the Revolution in France.12 The first, more widely 
noted, strand emphasizes the role of tradition and custom as 
embodying practices that incorporate the collective insights of 
many people and that have proven successful over time: in 
short, the notion that the many are, in some meaningful sense, 
smarter than the few.13 A second aspect, however, recognizes 
that tradition and custom are not sacrosanct.14 Some 
traditions, after all—slavery and the subjugation of women, 
among others—are repellent.15 Moreover, as Cass Sunstein has 
noted, Burkeanism fails when custom is based on collective 
action (or other related) problems and thus fails to embody 
latent wisdom.16 Indeed, Burke himself famously recognized 
that change is sometimes both necessary and inevitable.17 
Nevertheless, I argued, a Burkean-inspired approach (to 
matters generally, or to patent law in particular) would tend to 
prefer gradual or incremental change whenever possible; would 
be wary of the unintended consequences of radical reform; and 
would be receptive to the possibility that tradition may embody 
practical wisdom that, in the words of the twentieth century 
Burkean Michael Oakeshott, cannot be reduced to mere 
technique.18 
Applying this framework to the patent eligibility debate as 
                                                          
 11. See generally Cotter, supra note 2. 
 12. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 
(Frank M. Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1790). 
 13. See id. at 74; Cotter, supra note 2, at 856–57. 
 14. See BURKE, supra note 12, at 19; Cotter, supra note 2, at 857. 
 15. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 857. 
 16. See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 
371 (2006). 
 17. See BURKE, supra note 12, at 51–52, 133, 143. 
 18. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 878 (citing MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, 
RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 26 (1991)). 
COTTER LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  11:09 AM 
2010] BURKEAN PERSPECTIVE 371 
 
it existed in 2006, I argued that some of the then-disfavored 
eligibility doctrines may have embodied a measure of 
underappreciated wisdom. Focusing on three doctrines in 
particular (technological arts, mental steps, and physical 
transformation), I attempted both to distill the rationales that 
underlay these doctrines and to reformulate them in a manner 
that would preserve that kernel of wisdom without unduly 
interfering with the ability of the patent system to promote the 
progress of the useful arts.19 Properly reformulated, I argued, 
these doctrines would serve the purpose of ensuring that laws 
of nature and other naturally occurring phenomena would 
remain in the public domain; of serving as a backup when other 
doctrines fail to attain this goal; and of ensuring that the 
patent system avoid intruding into the domains of human 
thought processes and other protected areas of human liberty 
and autonomy.20 At the same time, I argued, there may no good 
reason to exclude software and business-related art from the 
domain of patents altogether; times do indeed change.21 
Properly revised, I concluded, the three above-mentioned 
doctrines would introduce modest but non-negligible restraints 
on what I perceived to be an ever-expanding patent system.22 
III.  REFLECTIONS ON THE COUNTERREVOLUTION 
In many respects the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence from 
the past four years has (in my view) provided a necessary 
corrective to that ever-expanding system. In eBay, the Court 
laid to rest the Federal Circuit rule under which the prevailing 
patent owner was almost automatically entitled to injunctive 
relief.23 In KSR, the Court rejected the “rigid” application of the 
                                                          
 19. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 884–95. 
 20. See id. On the human liberty and autonomy point, my argument was 
greatly influenced by scholars such as Kevin Collins, Alan Durham, and Jay 
Thomas. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 
317 (2007) [hereinafter Collins, Propertizing Thought]; Kevin Emerson Collins, 
Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Problem of Insufficient 
Thought Control, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 759; Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the 
Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419; John R. Thomas, Liberty and 
Property in Patent law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 569 (2002) [hereinafter Thomas, 
Liberty and Property]; John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal 
Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999) [hereinafter Thomas, Liberal 
Professions]. 
 21. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 883–84. 
 22. See id. at 884–95. 
 23. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006). 
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Federal Circuit’s teaching-suggestion-motivation test as the 
overriding criterion for evaluating nonobviousness,24 and in 
Microsoft v. AT & T the Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s 
expansive interpretation of Patent Act § 271(f).25 In other cases, 
the Court made it easier for patent licensees to challenge 
patent validity,26 and reaffirmed the vitality of the first-sale 
doctrine.27 These decisions may be open to criticism in various 
respects, but at least in a rough sense the Court appears to 
have made a positive contribution by nudging patent doctrine 
away from some of the dysfunctional aspects that critics had 
flagged in recent years.28 
But just as Burke counseled against an unthinking 
adherence to custom and tradition, we should be wary about 
indulging an unthinking nostalgia for pre-Federal Circuit 
patent doctrine. Confining my remarks to patent eligibility, my 
own view is that the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-
transformation standard as announced in Bilski29 is probably 
an improvement over State Street Bank.30 Applied woodenly, 
                                                          
 24. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). 
 25. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441–42 (2007). 
 26. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007). 
 27. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2119 
(2008). 
 28. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: 
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH 
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT 
SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (2004); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT 
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds. 2004). 
 29. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953–54 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. 
granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (“A claimed process is 
surely patent-eligible . . . if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, 
or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing”; that 
patentable methods do not preempt all practical uses of a fundamental 
principle; and that “the recited machine or transformation must not constitute 
mere ‘insignificant post solution activity.’”). 
 30. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1373–76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a system that involved the 
transformation of data by a machine constituted patentable subject matter, 
because it was a “practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, 
or calculation, because it produce[d] a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result’”; 
and laying to rest the exclusion of business methods from the scope of patent 
eligibility), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943. 
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however, the Bilski standard potentially produces some 
dubious results. Does it make sense, for example, not to 
characterize a general purpose computer as equivalent to a 
“particular machine,” while two such computers linked together 
are?31 Is the Bilski standard a good fit for diagnostic and 
therapeutic method patents?32 More generally, does Bilski 
really address the core concerns that once underlay the mental 
steps and technological arts doctrines, or does it merely sweep 
those concerns under the rug? Drawing on my 2006 paper and 
on insights from other scholars (as well as some of the amicus 
briefs that have been filed in connection with the Bilski 
litigation), I present below three screens that I believe would 
embody the essential wisdom of the past while remaining 
flexible enough to meet new technological challenges. 
IV.  THREE SCREENS 
A.  TECHNOLOGICAL ARTS 
As the first of my proposed three screens, I suggest that 
courts seriously consider reintroducing some version of the 
technological arts doctrine. As I noted in 2006, case law and 
USPTO guidelines were, until relatively recently, uniform in 
stating that such a doctrine existed.33 Some, though not all, 
scholars equate the “technological arts” with the “useful arts” 
mentioned in article I of the Constitution,34 and a technological 
arts doctrine is common to other patent systems.35 That said, 
                                                          
 31. See Ex parte Wasynczuk, 87 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1826, 1833–34 
(B.P.A.I. 2008) (concluding that a combination of two computing devices 
operating together was a particular apparatus). 
 32. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 
129, 134–38 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Claim 13 of plaintiff’s 
patent, which recited a method comprising (1) testing a blood or tissue sample 
for the presence of an elevated level of homocysteine, and (2) correlating an 
elevated level with a folate or cobalamin deficiency, did not constitute 
patentable subject matter); Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), pet’n for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 
3254 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2009) (No. 09-490); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. 
Biogen Idec, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2008). 
 33. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 862, 868–69. 
 34. See id. at 875 n.112 (citing sources for and against this proposition). 
 35. See id. at 885 n.154 (noting the presence of such a requirement within 
the European Patent Office); Kelvin W. Willoughby, How Much Does 
Technology Really Matter in Patent Law? A Comparative Analysis of Doctrines 
of Appropriate Patentable Subject Matter in American and European Patent 
Law, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 63 (2008) (discussing technological arts doctrines in 
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the U.S. case law and commentary was never entirely clear 
about exactly what the technological arts doctrine meant, and 
depending on how it is phrased the doctrine can carry different 
meanings. Be that as it may, my proposal is that, to be patent 
eligible, the claimed invention must in some meaningful sense 
(1) harness the forces of nature (2) in some stable, predictable, 
and reproducible manner36 (3) to achieve a practical end result. 
So construed, the doctrine would preclude, among other things, 
attempts to patent laws of nature and other naturally occurring 
phenomena; abstract ideas; and aesthetic creations. To this 
end, the doctrine would help to buttress other standard patent 
law doctrines, including utility, inherency, nonobviousness, 
claim definiteness, and enablement.37 As I have argued before, 
some degree of redundancy or doctrinal overlap may actually be 
a virtue, insofar as it increases one’s confidence that the rules 
at issue are serving legitimate purposes, and serves as 
insurance that, should courts or other policymakers fail in 
correctly applying one doctrine another may serve as a backup 
to attain the correct result.38 In addition, the doctrine as 
formulated above would help to clarify the boundaries between 
patent and copyright, which otherwise increasingly risk 
becoming blurred.39 Finally, a technological arts doctrine of the 
type I propose here would ensure that the patent system 
remains off-limits to inventions the practice of which requires 
no physical structure of any sort. As such, this screen would 
serve as a backup for screens two and three below, both of 
which are intended to prevent the patent system from invading 
important liberty and autonomy interests. To the extent an 
inventor could easily add a technological “step” to an otherwise 
nontechnological invention, however, this screen would leave 
intact a robust patent incentive. It would only screen out claims 
                                                          
different European nations); Brief of Amicus Curiae William Mitchell College 
of Law Intellectual Property Institute in Support of Respondent at 22–24, 
Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (Oct. 2, 2009) (noting presence of a similar 
requirement in Japanese and German law). 
 36. This requirement is inspired by Yahoo!’s amicus brief in Bilski. See 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo!, Inc. in Support of Neither Party at 4, Bilski v. 
Kappos, No. 08-964 (Aug. 6, 2009) (arguing that patentable processes must be 
“stable, predictable, and reproducible—i.e., . . . ‘machine-like’”). 
 37. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 882–84. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See, e.g., Andrew F. Knight, A Potentially New IP: Storyline Patents, 
86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 859 (2004) (arguing in favor of patenting 
storylines). 
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that are drafted so broadly (such as Bilski’s)40 as to require no 
physical instantiation whatsoever and—at the other end of the 
spectrum—inventions that are likely to have little if any social 
value, such as a method for proposing marriage.41 At the same 
time, requiring the drafter to add that technological step would 
not be an exercise in mere formalism; it would help to ensure 
that patent law neither preempts all practical applications of 
fundamental principles42 nor unduly siphons off social 
resources to trivia. 
B.  MINIMAL PHYSICALITY 
My second proposed screen would require that a claimed 
method reflect at least some minimal degree of physicality. In 
this respect, I would modify the Bilski standard and draw upon 
the dissenting opinion in Ex parte Lundgren43 to require that a 
method either (1) effect a physical transformation, external to 
the human actor, of matter or energy from one state to another, 
or (2) be tied to some tangible thing (but not necessarily a 
“particular machine”). In addition, drawing on the work of 
Professor Kevin Collins,44 I would require that a method 
                                                          
 40. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. 
granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (noting that Claim 1 
did not require the use of “any specific machine or apparatus”). 
 41. See U.S. Patent App. No. 20070078663 (filed Mar. 3, 2003), available 
at http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsear
ch-
bool.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&co1=AND&d=PG01&s1=20070078663.PGNR.&OS
=DN/20070078663&RS=DN/20070078663. According to one source, this 
application was subsequently abandoned. See Comments to Posting of Orin 
Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1207635554.shtml 
(Apr. 8, 2008, 2:19 AM). A technological arts doctrine could be more stringent, 
of course, than what I propose above. In Part IV, I discuss some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of a stricter standard. 
 42. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 953 (explaining that Supreme Court case law 
allows patents for particular applications of fundamental principles). 
 43. 76 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1385, 1399 (B.P.A.I. 2005) (Barrett, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 44. See Collins, Propertizing Thought, supra note 20, at 331; see also Brief 
of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Kevin Emerson Collins in Support of Neither 
Party at 12–13, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (Aug. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Collins 
Amicus Brief]; Posting of Kevin Emerson Collins to Patently-O, An Initial 
Comment on Prometheus: The Irrelevance of Intangibility, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/09/an-initial-comment-on-prometheus-
the-irrelevance-of-intangibility-1.html (Sept. 17, 2009, 5:42 PM) [hereinafter 
Collins, Initial Comment]. 
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contain at least one step that both (1) distinguishes the method 
from the prior art and (2) cannot be performed mentally. The 
intuition here is twofold. First, a patentable invention should 
have some effect on or relation of the external physical world. A 
common problem with many method patents in recent years is 
the level of abstraction with which they are drafted; the 
resulting fuzziness in the scope of the property right, in turn, 
reduces the social utility of the patent system as a tool for 
inducing innovation.45 Some connection with the physical 
world, as Professors Bohannan and Hovenkamp have noted, 
reduces the social costs of unduly abstract patent claims.46 
Second, the second part of the test ensures that it cannot be an 
act of even “technical” patent infringement to think patentable 
thoughts.47 In these respects, the minimal physicality screen 
helps to ensure that abstract ideas, human cognition, and (once 
again) laws of nature and other naturally occurring phenomena 
remain in the public domain. At the same time, as phrased 
above the criterion would accommodate the patentability of 
diagnostic and therapeutic methods like the ones at issue in 
Laboratory Corp. of American and Prometheus v. Mayo as long 
as those claims contain a third, physical step (in addition to 
what Collins refers to as the “determine” and “infer” steps)48 
that distinguishes them from the prior art.49 
                                                          
 45. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 28, at 194–212. 
 46. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert J. Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: 
Reformation and Harm 40, 47–48 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 09-16, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1377382. 
 47. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 893 & n.191. I have argued before that, 
even if it is unlikely that any patent owner would actually file suit against 
someone for thinking patentable thoughts, the wisdom of a system that 
renders such private (and sometimes involuntary) conduct even technically 
infringing is difficult to grasp. I suggest below that the inclusion of a third, 
nonmental step to “determine and infer” claims should provide an adequate 
incentive to engage in socially useful invention without the absurdity of 
rendering persons even technically liable based on the content of their brains. 
Moreover, while one might argue that my proposed approach introduces a 
measure of formalism into patent drafting, my response is that the distinction 
between a “determine and infer” claim and a claim involving a third 
nonmental step is not merely a matter of form, but rather works (1) to 
preserve the dignitary interest in preventing patent claims from reading on 
human thought processes and (2) to keep the naturally occurring correlation 
between some physical phenomenon and a human condition within the public 
domain. 
 48. Collins, Initial Comment, supra note 44. 
 49. See id. According to some of the Bilski amicus briefs, the ability to 
patent such methods provides an important incentive for investment in so-
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C.  NONINVASIVENESS 
Under my third proposed screen, and perhaps most 
controversially, an invention would not be patent eligible if its 
enforcement would unduly interfere with fundamental liberty 
interests or with the domain of copyright law. Inspired here 
principally by the work of Jay Thomas50 I suggest that a screen 
of this type would prevent the state, through the 
intermediation of the patent system, from intruding upon (for 
example) the provision of advice that otherwise would be 
privileged by reason of doctor-patient, attorney-client, or priest-
penitent relationships.51 In addition, the introduction of this 
screen would (like the technological arts screen) help to prevent 
patent law from encroaching upon copyright by precluding the 
patenting of subject matter such as books, music, motion 
pictures, and story lines. Moreover, by operating at a 
subconstitutional level, this screen would enable courts to avoid 
having to decide difficult questions such as whether the 
issuance and enforcement of patents falling into these 
categories intrudes upon constitutionally protected speech or 
privacy interests.52 
V.  CONCLUSION: SOME APPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE 
DRAWBACKS 
Many applications of my three proposed screens should be 
relatively straightforward. As noted above, the physicality 
screen would exclude “determine and infer” claims such as 
Metabolite’s claim 13 (but it would not exclude a hypothetical 
alternative claim that included a third, nonmental step that 
distinguished the invention from the prior art).53 Similarly, 
                                                          
called personalized medicine. See, e.g., Brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24–25, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 
(Aug. 6, 2009); Brief of Amicus Curiae Medtronic, Inc. in Support of Neither 
Party at 10–12, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (Aug. 6, 2009). Absent evidence to 
the contrary, however, it seems unlikely that requiring the addition of a third, 
nonmental step would greatly weaken the patent incentive; and it would 
preserve the dignitary and public domain interests that I identified above. 
 50. See Thomas, Liberty and Property, supra note 20; Thomas, Liberal 
Professions, supra note 20. 
 51. Imagine, for example, a claim to a method for hearing a penitent’s 
confession. 
 52. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 881–82 (citing Thomas, Liberty and 
Property, supra note 20, at 609). 
 53. See supra notes 47–49. 
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claims such as those at issue in Bilski, Comiskey, and 
Ferguson,54 all of which would read on purely intangible 
processes, would be excluded under the physicality screen as 
well as, most likely, by the technological arts criterion.55 
Patents claiming legal methods (including the tax planning 
patents that many observers find offensive,56 as well as others 
such as the method for selecting a jury57) would be excluded by 
the noninvasiveness criterion (and possibly by the first two 
screens in addition). Other types of intangible methods, such as 
the aforementioned application for a patent for a method for 
proposing marriage, would be excluded by the technological 
arts screen and possibly by the other two as well. 
The vast majority of claimed inventions, on the other hand, 
would still be patent eligible under my criteria. The physicality 
screen as defined above would permit many business and 
software-related methods to be patented, as long as (for 
example) they are tied to a machine or apparatus (such as a 
general purpose computer). Genes and other naturally 
occurring substances that are refined and isolated from their 
natural state, and that can be put to some practical human 
purpose, would still be patent eligible, as would (as noted) 
diagnostic and therapeutic methods the point of novelty of 
which is a nonmental step. 
To be sure, the relative modesty of my three proposed 
screens will appear to some observers as a drawback. Many 
people (though not I) still decry the patentability of genes, 
human created life forms, and other products of 
biotechnology.58 On somewhat firmer ground, in my view, are 
                                                          
 54. See In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that 
claimed method failed the machine-or-transformation test); In re Comiskey, 
554 F.3d 967, 980–81 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 
(2009). 
 55. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Yahoo!, Inc., supra note 36, at 4. 
 56. See, e.g., A Bill to Amend Title 35, United States Code, to Limit 
Damages and Other Remedies with Respect to Patents for Tax Planning 
Methods, H.R. 2365, 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
http://tax.aicpa.org/NR/rdonlyres/5A89F6D0-7757-4135-8B78-
8AB8433C94E8/0/Tax_Planning_Method_Patents.pdf; Wade M. Chumney et 
al., Patents Gone Wild: An Ethical Examination and Legal Analysis of Tax-
Related and Tax Strategy Patents, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 343, 343–47 (2009) 
(introducing an argument for reducing the scope of tax-planning patents). 
 57. See U.S. Patent No. 6,607,389 (filed Dec. 3, 2001). 
 58. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Off., 
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those who argue that (notwithstanding some possible 
counterexamples) the extension of patent eligibility to software 
and business methods has produced, on net, far greater social 
costs than benefits.59 My response to this critique, however, is 
to note that patent eligibility is a crude filter for carrying out 
social policy. Once we move beyond the narrow functions I have 
articulated above—of keeping laws of nature and other natural 
phenomena within the public domain, or preserving important 
human liberty and autonomy interests, and of maintaining 
some boundary between the domains of patent and copyright 
law—any consensus is much harder to maintain and is, in my 
view, a matter better addressed either by other patent law 
doctrines or, if necessary, by legislative action. An important 
consideration here is that, even if under current circumstances 
the social costs of business and software-related patents 
outweigh the benefits, that mix of costs and benefits may vary 
over time, as well as from one industry to another. Rather than 
excluding such subject matter from the scope of patent 
protection altogether, a rational patent system might strive to 
constrain the potential social costs through judicious 
applications of such proxies as nonobviousness, claim 
definiteness, and enablement doctrine. In this sense, patent 
eligibility exclusions should be reserved for the relatively “easy” 
cases. 
Other possible critiques of my approach may evince 
differing reactions. Some observers may argue that the term 
“technology” or “technological arts” cannot be adequately 
defined, or that any proposed definition is so broad as to 
exclude relatively little, if anything.60 To the extent these 
                                                          
__F. Supp. 2d __, 2009 WL 3614434, at *1, 12–14, 28–29 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 
2009) (denying motion to dismiss claim that patents on genetic sequences are 
unconstitutional). 
 59. See Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Peter S. Menell & Michael J. 
Meurer in Support of Respondent at 31, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (Oct. 2, 
2009). 
 60. See Brief of Regulatory DataCorp et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party at 28–29, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (Aug. 6, 2009) (arguing that 
“innovations in business, finance, and other applied economic fields plainly 
qualify as ‘technological’” under a definition that stresses “‘the practical 
application of knowledge in a particular area’”) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2348 (1963)); see also W. BRIAN ARTHUR, THE NATURE 
OF TECHNOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT EVOLVES 56 (2009) (though not 
offering an opinion on the patentable subject matter debate, suggesting that in 
a sense even works of art can be viewed as technological insofar as they 
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critiques depend on dictionary definitions of technology, 
however, I find them less than persuasive; legal terms often, 
and unremarkably, depart from standard everyday usage. I do 
concede, however, that if the “forces of nature” include the 
“laws” of economics, psychology, and other social scientific 
disciplines—a proposition which I am inclined to accept, 
assuming that the purported laws are sufficiently predictable, 
etc., in their application—the universe of “technology” will be 
correspondingly expansive. Coming at the issue from the other 
side, some critics may argue that because my proposed 
technological arts requirement only requires that the invention 
use technology it will include too much. Alternative definitions 
of technological arts might require that the invention perform a 
technological function, or pertain to a technological field, or (yet 
more difficult to satisfy) contribute a technical solution to a 
technical problem.61 These more rigorous definitions of 
technological arts presumably would exclude many sports 
moves (as well as the infamous patent for a method of 
exercising a cat by means of a laser pointer62), whereas it’s not 
clear that mine would. 
Similar critiques might be raised with respect to my 
physicality and noninvasiveness criteria. As noted above, in 
order to implement a version of the mental steps doctrine the 
physicality screen would require application of a “point of 
novelty” test that, in many other patent contexts,63 is 
disfavored and is (in any event) inelegant.64 To some, the 
noninvasiveness criterion might seem vague and, like the 
                                                          
stimulate human emotions in an intentional manner). The Regulatory 
DataCorp brief also notes that, in U.S. practice, games have been considered 
patentable subject matter for many decades. See id. at 29. Are games 
technological under my definition, simply because they make use of physical 
artifacts and are human creations? 
 61. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 888–89 (noting this approach in EPO case 
law); Willoughby, supra note 35, at 135 (concluding, after surveying the 
technological arts doctrines in different European nations, that there is “a 
good deal” of variation). 
 62. See U.S. Patent No. 6,701,872 (filed Oct. 30, 2002). 
 63. Point of novelty appears to retain vitality in connection with the 
printed matter doctrine, however. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). In the amicus brief he filed in Bilski, Collins argues that printed 
matter and mental steps are two sides of the same coin. See Collins Amicus 
Brief, supra note 44, at 22. 
 64. On the inelegance point, see Cotter, supra note 2, at 887 n.162. 
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disfavored “moral utility” doctrine,65 to tax the USPTO’s 
institutional competence. 
My response to all of these possible critiques, however, is 
as before twofold. First, because traditional patent eligibility 
standards (as I view them) implicate longstanding intuitions 
that the patent system should not impinge upon certain of 
realms—natural laws, human liberty and autonomy interests, 
and the domain of copyright—patent examiners, courts, and 
other policymakers will necessarily need to exercise judgment 
in evaluating cases near the boundary. If the interests served 
by these doctrines are as important as I perceive them to be, 
they are worth preserving even when doing so might appear to 
tax institutional capabilities. Second, however, because these 
interests can be preserved by relatively narrow limits on the 
scope of patentable subject matter, broader exclusions are in 
my view less clearly defensible. In particular, broad exclusions 
from patent eligibility that depend on cost/benefit estimates 
that may change over time may be less desirable than more 
finely honed approaches to what may prove to be temporary 
problems. For better or worse, my proposed framework seeks to 
preserve the wisdom of the older doctrines while retaining the 
patent system’s flexibility to adapt to new technologies. 
Properly modified, patent eligibility doctrine can serve as a 
useful—but modest—tool for achieving important—but 
nevertheless limited—human purposes. 
 
 
                                                          
 65. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting application of the “moral utility” doctrine to 
preclude the patenting of immoral or fraudulent inventions). 
